This paper aims outspreading preexisting researches by assessing practically and empirically how board characteristics play a vibrant role in magnitude of earning management (EM) for the Jordanian listed companies. In particular, the paper throws its light on the principle features of the board of directors, i.e. board independence, CEO duality, financial expertise, governance expertise, firmspecific expertise and size. In this paper, a cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones Model is applied to ensure the accurate assessment of the key impacts of board characteristics on EM for a sample of 86 industrial listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the years 2008 to 2010. Discretionary accruals are used as proxy for EM. This study, on the basis of findings, reveals the significant correlation between salient board features and EM. Findings of this systematic observation demonstrate that board independence, financial expertise, governance expertise and size have a negative relation with EM. It also found that CEO duality and board firm-specific expertise have an obvious positive relation with discretionary accruals. The findings suggested that the board character has an effective role in detecting EM and in turn improve financial reporting quality (FRQ). In real fields, the discoveries of this paper portray valuable information for the regulators in different countries. The results also provide useful information for investors in assessing the impact of board characteristics on FRQ. In fact, previous studies on this very issue in this context do not meet the demand of comprehensive observation appropriately. To make input in this area, particularly among Jordanian companies, this study will extend the scope through providing empirically tested findings of the role of board directors' characteristics on EM. In addition, this paper is the first empirical study to investigate the relationship between the board of directors' characteristics and EM in Jordan.
Introduction
Several corporate scandals along with the changing trend of global economic environment forced the development of corporate governance. The core of these scandals was EM phenomenon (Goncharov, 2005; Habbash, 2010) . Moreover, the East Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 focused the fragility and incapability of poor governance standards that were, in a great extent, indirectly liable for the crisis. This resulted a sharp fall down in foreign investors' confidence curve in the capital market (Hashim and Devi, 2009; Leng, 2004; Nam and Nam, 2004; Rahman and Haniffa, 2005) . These situations have drawn the immense concentration to improve the corporate governance to improve FRQ and in turn, recapture the investors' confidence in the capital market (Abed et al., 2012; Ebrahim, 2007; Pergola, 2005) .
Jordan similarly faces the experiences of financial scandals such as Shamayleh Gate. This required Jordan to consolidate both the foundation and the principles of corporate governance in order to endorse transparency, accountability and the rule of law (JFED, 2003) . To help Jordan in this, the present study offers empirical tests and analysis on the explicit and implicit impacts of board characteristics on EM.
Razaee et al. (2003) and Waweru and Riro (2013) stated that good corporate governance promotes practice mechanisms of accountability among the primary corporate participants and this may enhance overall corporate performance. Healthy corporate governance holds management accountable to shareholders. A number of prominent participants in the debates surrounding financial reporting and auditing practices have increased attention on the role of corporate governance procedures in the development of credible financial statement information (Levitt, 1998) . Previous studies suggested that corporate governance can be associated with higher FRQ ( This study is, obviously, a breakthrough for the following whys and wherefores: first, the researcher affords a novel contribution to the EM literature; meanwhile as this paper is the first original input to delve the relationship between the impacts of several characteristics of board of directors and EM activities. There is also no solitary study that has addressed the effectiveness issue of the board governance expertise and board firm-specific expertise in monitoring company management with respect to EM. By the way, the present study puts an original/ordinary/primary type contribution to understanding the interrelating of the board role. Additional interesting feature of investigation this issue in Jordan context is that the Jordan Corporate Governance Code (JCGC) have gone through a series of processes and stages of amendments and improvements to form the present code. The researcher conducting the first study to inspect the relationship between board of directors and the extent of opportunistic EM in Jordan since the JCGC has been introduced in 2009. This study may shed some light on the effectiveness of the latest corporate governance recommendations on improving FRQ in Jordan. Finally, previous literatures are mainly based on and related with the context of United State of America (USA) and United Kingdom (UK). To the best of our knowledge, there is slight research into the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and managers' engagements in EM in Jordanian listed companies. Hofstede (2003) and De Zoysa and Rudkin (2010) documented that while the USA and the UK are similar in many aspects, numerous organizational differences exist in these two countries. In term of corporate governance recommendations, many international accounting researches find a number of differences in the composition of boards, levels of executive compensation and the functions of audit committee (Ferguson et al., 2004; Monks and Minow, 2011) . Not only corporate governance but also the EM notion is diverse amongst the two countries. Brown and Ngo Higgins (2002) claimed that the level to which USA managers manage earnings is significantly higher than that extent of their counterparts in the UK. It thus considered valuable to spread the previously testes empirical evidences through references and comparison to Jordan context to find how and in what extent Jordan is different from USA and UK.
Jordan is one amongst countries where the users developed a common trend to rely on accounting numbers for decision-making; it drawn a massive importance to reflect the area of EM to protect the users from being misled. Moreover, in Jordanian context, the lack of studies about EM forced this study to aim at providing evidence regarding EM activities. Using a sample of Jordan companies listed in ASE, this paper examines the impact of the boards' characteristics on the magnitude of discretionary accruals. The founded data suggests that board independence, board financial expertise, board governance expertise and know-hows and board size are negatively and significantly related to EM, while CEO duality and board firm-specific expertise (tenure) are positively and significantly related with EM.
Findings from this study could benefits corporate governance bodies that are considering reforms over the best practices. In particular, this study finds that the corporate governance mechanism (board) appears to be negatively related to EM. CEO duality and board firm-specific expertise are of the least important variables in respect to improving FRQ (Klein, 2002b; Hashim, 2009 ; Rahman and Ali, 2006) . Given that CEO duality and board tenure are the most important platform for board of directors to discuss and share their expertise, it is awkward when they are viewed as a less credible internal governance mechanism. Regulators and other standard setters will have to pay their deep concentration on this issue. Findings from this study are also being mainly beneficial to the shareholders, management and public members who are carefully concerned about the harmful effects of EM. In light of a latest corporate scandal in 2011 including Olympus, the finding from this study stresses the significance of companies providing sufficient monitoring and information to retain investors and analysts well informed. This study can have a great benefit for researchers who are engaged in investigating the implications of corporate governance mechanisms in deterring EM. As this study found that the effects of board characteristics exceed in reducing EM. This study wills also carry values for the academics as it takes into account possible for simultaneous association between board and EM.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses the literature review and hypotheses development. Section three portrays a picture of the research design. Section four demonstrates the findings and analysis. Lastly section five presents the summary and conclusions..
Literature Review

Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ)
Verdi (2006) conceptually defined FRQ as the precision with which financial reporting conveys information about the firm's operations, in particular its expected cash flows, in order to inform equity investors. Schiller and Vegt (2010 as cited in Francis et al., 2008) argued that accounting quality has a great impact from multiple dimensions. They used a tow-dimensional concept: they first asked whether there is faithful representation that if the earnings report is unbiased. If an earnings report is faithful, it leads to a better reflection of the shareholder value in the stock price. Secondly, they asked if the report is regular on the basis of its scheduled fixed time. If a manager has early financial information, the introduction of interim reporting leads to an increased timeliness if the information is disclosed at the interim stage rather than at the end of the fiscal year. To summarize, they defined accounting quality as improved if, for a given degree of timeliness, there is increased faithfulness or if, for a given degree of faithfulness, there is better timeliness.
Financial reporting, in its ideal sense, should provide information to help investors, creditors, and other users assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise. Available data on enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual accounting generally demonstrates a relatively obvious indication of enterprise performance than the data on current cash receipts and payments (IASB, 2010). The plea for having a full-fledge financial report and its openness arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ). Hence, the purpose of corporate reporting is to ensure disclosure of necessary information that is useful to a wide range of users in designing economic decisions. Standards and Poor's (2003) correctly observed that, investor confidence and market efficiency depend on the disclosure of accurate and timely information about corporate performance. However, Cascino et al. (2010) refers the quality of accounting information to the informativeness of reported numbers, the level of disclosure, and the degree of compliance with generally accepted accounting standards.
FRQ can be examined from the perspective of EM, financial restatement and fraud (Barth et al., 2008; Nichols and Wahlen, 2004 Schipper, 1989) . Schipper (1989, p. 92 ) defined EM as: "… purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains". In addition, Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) stated that EM may occur: "… when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports in order to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence", in a severe extant, "contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers". Moreover, Levitt (1998) the Chairman of SEC, said: numbers game, expressed the concern and fears about the EM practices and sequentially the negative effects on FRQ. "Choices, judgments and estimates are an inevitable consequence of not being able to observe, measure and communicate economic value-added accurately and reliably" (Brown, 1999, p. 61) . A great number of techniques and mechanisms are available that managers can apply the judgment in an effective financial reporting and in turn results relatively better and more opportunities for them to manipulate earning for their benefits. The financial reporting judgment decorates prospects for managers to manage earnings by choosing the reporting methods along with the estimation that did not precisely reflect the firms underlying economics (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) .
The above definition of EM is focused on the managers' intent, which is hard to observe (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Lo, 2008; Loomis, 1999; Wiedman, 2002) . As an inexorable outcome, this is quite usual to perceive the reported numbers by having a deep observation for the related context where EM is primarily like to happen and try to gather large firms' samples in the same context to provide evidence of EM activity (Wiedman, 2002) . Consequently, the measurement discussions of EM issues are on-going because the difficulty differentiates between the management true belief and the management intention to manipulate earnings. Healy and Wahlen (1999) studied the literature of EM and its implications for the standard setting. They argued that previous EM literature did not afford notable evidence on the interest question to standard setters but only documented the presence of EM issues. Questions about the EM choice and level are, willy-nilly, left unanswered because of these measurement issues. Furthermore, assumed that managers are more sophisticated; the process in which they deal with and engage in EM are not simple-minded as well as it is not amazing that the newest studies documented EM in their studies (Lo, 2008) . In consideration of the issues of this measurement, the evidence of EM is attained through looking at the managers' incentives to manage earnings (Dechow and Schrand, 2004) . The circumstances which take place as effect where the causes are those incentives are identified and followed over the estimation of unexpected accruals to observe the impact of managers' discretion (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) . Christensen et al. (1999) proposed that as managers have incentives and potentials to manage earning they are engaged in EM. There are three main incentives that afforded managers to manage earnings, i.e. contractual incentives, market incentives and regulatory incentives (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Jackson and Pitman, 2001 ).
In the recapitulation, it could be assumed that EM arises when there are incentives and opportunities for it. As a result, the question can be raised: how companies are able to get away of it? This question leads to the following subsequent discussion of the role that corporate governance can play in reducing EM activity and in turn, safeguarding and improving FRQ.
Corporate governance
Corporate governance denotes the governing companies which act in order to protect shareholders' interest. The differentiation of ownership and control has directed to the assortment of appropriate corporate governance mechanisms to confirm the alignment of interest of principle and agents in an efficient way. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) viewed corporate governance form the agency perspective that investors will get their investment back from managers. The agency theory has a deep concern about the problem of principle-agent in the separation of ownership and control of the company and addresses the possible for agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976 The above definition identifies the role of boards of directors as an agent to direct and control the firms as well as communicate the accurate underlying financial information to the shareholders. The board of directors is quite active in performing the monitoring role on behalf of the shareholders and has the major responsibilities to lead and direct the firm in order to attain corporate goals through closely monitoring the management mechanisms and shielding the interest of shareholders. Additionally, the board is considered as the most powerful and effective corporate governance for scrutinizing the management activities to increase the value of firm (Abdullah and Nasir, 2004; Hashim, 2009 ). The presence of effective board ensures the presence of effective alignment of both managers' and owners' interests to actuate the shareholders' funds along with earnings so that the earnings are similar among every shareholders of the same firm.
Due to the significance of board as one of governance mechanisms, this paper has paid a great effort to assess the salient characteristics of boards empirically.
Being equipped with this understanding permits Jordanian regulatory agencies to lessen EM activity and in turn increase FRQ.
2.2.1
Corporate governance and financial reporting quality One of the most important corporate governance functions is to ensure the process of FRQ (Cohen et al., 2004) . Watts and Zimmerman (1978, p. 113) stated that: "one function of financial reporting is to constrain management to act in the shareholders' interest". Davis-Friday et al. (2006) indicated that the value relevance of earnings and book value were significantly lessened in the time of the Asian financial crisis and was related to the relatively fragile performance of corporate governance mechanisms in four East Asian countries, i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea. Coombes and Wong (2004) revealed that the majority of investors have left their consent that that corporate governance is great concern and it has a great importance in strengthening the accounting disclosure quality. Bushman and Smith (2001) noted that the publicly disclosed accounting information can be applied as vital input information in different mechanisms of corporate governance. The significance of the corporate governance mechanisms to ameliorate FRQ and good corporate governance aids have a good outcome in decreases the risks of financial reporting problems (Cohen et The question of whether the mechanisms of corporate governance is effective given the wide corporate governance reforms for ensuring a significant decrease in EM and in turn, a notable increase in FRQ, is still an open vital query requiring additional empirical examination.
Hypotheses development
Board of directors is the most vital role maker in ensuring the effectiveness corporate governance mechanisms in order to enhance the quality and integrity of accounting information (Cadbury, 1992) . The most significant internal control mechanism as theorized by Fama and Jensen (1983) is not only the board of directors' precise responsibility for monitoring the top management actions but also the effective combination of work with senior management to attain corporate legal and ethical compliance. As a result, it increases the expectation that boards will constrain opportunistic EM activities (Abed et al., 2012; Epps and Ismail, 2009 ).
Board characteristics not only refer to its independence and CEO duality but also encompass the financial and governance expertise of the board members. The board firm-specific expertise and size are also vital among the elements of characteristics. It is imperative to find whether these attributes of the board of directors have a bearing on the EM incidence. Here, an examination of relevant past researches is presented in order to observe the effects of each characteristic on EM in a systematic process.
Board independence
The board of directors is a central mechanism as well as the central authority of internal control designed for scrutinizing the top management actions. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the board effectiveness is a function of its composition. They argued that the presence of non-executive members improves the internal control mechanism through the corporate board. Actually, all board members are supposed to work to ensure the growth of the wealth of shareholders, agency theory argued that non-executive directors, due to their independence and specialized expertise, are mainly influential monitoring device of the actions of executive directors.
Non-executive directors are possibly effective as: "outside directors have incentives to develop reputation as experts in decision control" (Fama and Jensen, 1983 , p. 315). The board also can be considered as an instrument through which managers control other managers. As described by Fama (1980, p. 293) , "if there is competition among the top managers themselves, then perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors".
Board composition ensures the impression to make an effective corporate governance mechanism to decrease agency problems and increase FRQ. Research, in general, supports the notion that nonexecutive directors play a vital role in both monitoring management and providing relevant complementary knowledge (Booth et al., 2002 Hence, previous empirical findings appear to betoken that boards which are structured to be more independent of the management are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. JCGC recommended at least half of the board should comprise of individual that have noexecutive responsibilities in the organization (nonexecutive director) Thus, these evidences lead us to the following hypothesis:
H1. The independence of the board of directors is negatively related to EM among Jordanian listed companies.
CEO duality
The differentiation among the roles of chairman and CEO is recommended to avoid the potential risk to concentrate the substantial power whereby similar person executes both roles (Davidson et al., 2005) . Agency theory also argued the separation of these two roles in order to ensure the effective monitoring over the process of board (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993; Saleh et al., 2005) . The independence role of chairman from the company affairs, whereas being on the company board and in turn, will be a beneficial check on the CEO (Rahman and Ali, 2006) . Research by Cornett et al. (2008) revealed that the separation of CEO and board chairperson will encourage a more efficient and effective supervision. Saleh et al. (2005) documented that the separation of two roles is significant in reducing EM activity. Rahman and Haniffa (2005) supported that by saying that companies with CEO duality did not perform well and incline to do EM. Klein (2002b) Barton et al. (2004, p. 61) indicated that in order to accomplish the tasks effectively, the boards must have the ability for: "asking management tough questions, actively helping to set corporate strategy, monitoring risk management, contributing to CEO successions plan and ensuring that companies set and meet their financial and operating targets". Directors, as both, an advice source and counsel for the CEO, are the key role maker in increasing the firms' value (Daily et al., 2003) . It is also notable for both inside and outside directors to put distinct contribution in the amelioration of FRQ and to provide access to the firms needed resources such as financial, governance and firm-specific expertise (Bedard et al., 2004 
Board financial expertise
Board governance expertise
Governance expertise denotes the caliber of the director's ability to appreciate and analyze the management and direction differences and to possess a perception about the knowhow of the board maneuvers encompassing the legal framework inside which they operate (Renton, 2003) . Additional directorships are indicating the directors' capacity to deal with the environment of the managerial labor market and to provide directors platform to achieve governance expertise (Bedard et al., 2004; Fama, 1980; Saleh et al., 2005) . Consequently, Beasley (1996) and Saleh et al. (2005) found the multiple directorships are negatively related to EM activity. The grater the number of the board seats directors hold the more sensitive performance took place to protect their reputations so in this matter generating an effective incentive to accomplish laden duties well and to ensure transparency in decision-making process through the best practices gained from other firms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Vafeas, 2005 
Board firm-specific expertise
Firm-specific expertise is achieved through an experience as a board member developing more knowledge of a company operations and its director's executive (Bedard et al., 2004) . Beasley (1996) found significant but negative connection between the number of years of board serve for outside directors and financial statement fraud. He believed that the board's capacity, in order to scrutinize the management, is consistent with the increased number of years they served. Peasnell et al. (1999; obtained the average tenure of non-executive directors on the board members has a relatively negative relationship with EM level. On the other hand, Hashim (2009) and Xie et al. (2003) found a significant positive relationship between board tenure and discretionary accruals. Bedard et al. (2004) 
H5. The firm-specific expertise of the board of directors is positively related to EM among Jordanian listed companies.
Board size
Previous studies demonstrated that larger boards are able to commit more time and effort (Rahman and Ali, 2006; Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Monks and Minow, 2011) whereas smaller boards are capable to commit comparatively less time and effort to monitor and scrutinize management (Rahman and Ali, 2006) . In fact, large board members with varied expertise could increase the synergetic of the board in decreasing the number incidences of EM. In addition, Klein (2002b) extended this argument by observing that board monitoring has a significant positive nexus with larger boards for their ability to distribute the workload to many people. Xie et al. (2003) revealed EM is less likely to take place in firms with larger boards. Yu (2008) found that small boards seem to have a comparatively more propensity to be failure in detecting EM. Implicit in these findings is that smaller boards incline to be influenced by the management or dominated by block-holders as larger boards have more effective ability to oversee the top management actions. Rahman and Ali of EM adopted or different markets and corporate governance practices. Based on the JCGC, the size of the board should be small enough (minimum 3) for efficient decision-making and large enough (maximum 13) for directors to contribute their board experiences and knowledge sufficiently. As such, the next hypothesis, which is related to board size and EM, is set as follows:
H6. The size of board of directors is negatively related to EM among Jordanian listed companies.
Research design
In this section, the present paper demonstrates the main model which is designed for and applied in this study; clarifies the operational definition of the variables used and explains the procedures of sample selection. First, the total accruals (TACC) are defined in this study as the difference between net income before extraordinary items (NI) and cash flow from operating activities (OCF): (2) Where, TACC is the total accrual, ΔREV is the change in operation revenue, ΔREC is the change in the net receivables, PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, t and t-1 are time subscripts and i is the firm subscript.
Definition of variables
Measuring earning management
Change in revenues is taken under consideration to control the economic circumstances of a firm whilst gross property, plant and equipment are included to control for the portion of total accruals related to non-discretionary depreciation expenses (Jones, 1991 The difference between total accruals and the non-discretionary components of accruals is considered as discretionary accruals (DACC) as stated below:
DACC it = TACC it /A it-1 -[β 0 (1/A it-1 ) + β 1 [(ΔREV it -ΔREC it )/A it-1 ] + β 2 (PPE it /A it-1 )] (3)
All variables are scaled by prior year total assets A it-1 to control for heteroscedastisity. 
Measuring board characteristics
Controlled variables
Factors other than corporate governance practices (board of directors) may also have an immense contribute in lessening EM and in turn improving FRQ. The study applies eight controlling variables: firm size, return on assets (ROA), cash flow operating (CFO), leverage, firm growth, managerial ownership, listing status and Big4.
It has been argued that the larger the firms, the more the potential for EM (Rahman and Ali The ASE has two separate tiers of stocks that are traded -the first market and the second market. However, it is notable that, the frequency of reporting is different between listed companies listed on the first market and those on the second market. Moreover, there are certain must-fulfilling prerequisites which must be met before a company can be listed in the first market of ASE. Those requirements include that the company must have made a pre-tax profit for at least two out of the three years before being listed. The company also fulfill certain requirements concerning the free-float and number of shareholders in the company. In addition, investors must be capable to sell their stocks easily through the stock exchange. Thus, it is required that shares of the first market companies are more actively traded than those of the second market. It is also more likely that the first market companies are more closely followed by financial analysts. Listing status is the indicator variable with the value of 1 if the company listed in the first market and 0 if otherwise. Previous studies have also portrayed that companies employing Big4 auditors resulted lower level of EM than companies employing non-Big4 auditors (Rahman and Ali, 2006; Balsam et al., 2003; Becker et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 2005) . In contrast to low quality auditors, high quality auditors like Big4 auditors are more likely to detect questionable of accounting practices and to a certain extent may constrain management to follow accounting standard.
Model specification
In light of above discussion, the various hypotheses are combining into function relation for describing the nexus between board characteristics and extent level of EM phenomenon. The empirical model is set out as follows: (4) Where DACC it denotes EM as measured by discretionary accruals; BRDIND it is the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board and expressed inpercentage; CEODUAL it is a dummy variable; its value equals to 1if the roles of the chairman and CEO it are combined and 0 if not; BRDFINEXP it refers to the proportion of directors with financial expertise on the board and express as a percentage; BRDGOVEXP it is the proportion of directors with directorship in other companies on the board and express as a percentage; BRDTENUR it means an average number of years of board services of independent non-executive directors; BRDSIZE it is the total number of board members. The controlled variable; FRMSIZE it delineates the natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; ROA it means the net income divided by the total assets at the beginning of the testing period; CFO it demonstrates the operating cash flows from operating activities divided by beginning of period total assets; LEV it presents the total debt divided by total assets; FRMGROWTH it indicates the percentage of total shares held by executives directors divided by the total number of shares; MNGOWNRSHP it is the percentage of total shares held by executive directors divided by total shares; LSTSTATUS it is a dummy variable takes the value of one if the company listed in the first market while 0 if not; BIG4 it is a dummy variable which will take the value of 1 if the company audit by big4 and 0 if audit by non-big4; β 0 is the intercept; β 1 -β 14 is the coefficient of slope parameters; and ε is error term.
Sample selection
The initial sample population chosen for this study included 94 Jordanian companies in 2008, 2009 and 2010 as they encompass a broad range of industrial sector and account for significant portion of Jordan economic output. The industrial sector in Jordan is considered as quite significant to the economy as it's a vast field of employment and the key contributor in economic growth. Therefore, perceiving the EM activities within this sector is vital to enhance the reliability and transparency of FRQ and consequently, to ameliorate the capacity of the investors to define the fair value. Corporate governance and financial variables were obtained from companies' annual report from the Jordanian Shareholding Companies (JSC) guide issued by ASE. Company with the inadequate data for board and financial data were excluded from the sample. A total 86 companies were included in the analysis which represents 91% of the Jordanian industrial companies. The final sample consists of 258 company-year observations in order to ensure an accrual estimation and empirical analysis.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 , the descriptive statistics for all variables are demonstrated. The descriptive statistics of DACC as presented in Table I , shows the absolute value of DACC for the companies in this study sample has a small mean value of 0.095, whereas the minimum value is much closer to 0 (0.0001). These findings are consistent with Klein (2002b) who obtained a minimum value of absolute DACC among large USA firms of 0.00002. However, the mean of absolute DACC among USA firms in Xie's study (Xie et al. 2003 ) is higher at 0.10. Othman and Zeghal (2006) reported closer means of absolute DACC among Canadian and French companies of 0.06 and 0.03, respectively. Rahman and Ali (2006) obtained the magnitude of absolute value of DACC of the Malaysian companies possesses a relatively small mean value of 0.04 whereas the minimum value is very much closer to 0 (0.0001). Moreover, Habbash (2010) indicated that the absolute value of DACC is 0.05 using UK companies and the minimum value is much closer to 0 (0.0001). The importance of discretionary rests with the assumption that discretionary accruals represent managers' discretion over accruals. This assumption is partly validated by the significant difference between DACC means. At such, the test provides evidences that, large Jordanian industrial companies, on average, manage their reported earnings. The correlation coefficient is further performed to assess the connection between the dependent and independent variables. This test examines the extent to which both dependent and each independent variable in the study are related. The correlation matrix (Pearson correlation) in Table 2 depicts that there are some significant relationships among the independent variables. The highest correlation is between BRDGOVEXP and BRDIND is 0.390 (P<0.05). This result implies that more effective external monitoring mechanisms have a significant relation to improve the internal monitoring mechanisms.
This study calculates the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) as well for the model and finds out that VIF values are within acceptable limits. Gujarati (2003) suggested that a VIF containing value of less than 10 is acceptable, so in this study the maximum VIF value is 1.38 while the mean is 1.21. Thus, the multicollinearity does not appear as a probable problem for this study model. Table 3 shows the VIF results.
Regression analysis
Regression analysis is one of the most commonly applied mechanisms in multivariate analysis which is applied in this study. OLS regression is considered to be a powerful technique when the model contains both dummy and continuous variables (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999) .
In the descriptive analysis, it can be observed that both skewness and kurtosis for some variables show high value. Data is considered to be normal if the standard skewness is within ± 1.96 and standard kurtosis is ± 2 (Rahman and Ali, 2006) . Consequently, the dependent variable and most of the independent variables are not generally distributed as shown in Table I . The lack of normality of the dependent variable is expected since this deliberately does not eliminate the outliers of this variable as the firms with extreme values of EM potentially provide the observations that portray large negative accruals or large positive accruals which may actually represent management discretion. Therefore, normality which is one of the important assumptions of the parametric test is not satisfied as this is expected in this type of study. Kao and Chen (2004) suggested that OLS regression is not an appropriate one when the dependent variable is the absolute value of EM as it's limited to only positive values. Generally, parametric tests seem as more powerful when all assumptions are met. However, if any single OLS regression assumption is exploited by the obtained data then non-parametric tests become more appropriate (Habbash, 2010) . In the view of Zhang and Liu (2009) and Habbash (2010) , non-parametric statistical techniques can be regarded as an alternative to parametric techniques. Non-parametric tests are considered to be a distribution-free method as they generate no assumption regarding the distribution of the sample scores. Additionally, non-parametric tests do not require the measurement of data on an interval scale and do not require data to meet the rigorous assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance required by the parametric method. Given the above discussion, non-parametric tests are applied in this study to examine the obtained data. This is because the data obtained in this study does not meet the conditions required by the parametric tests. Therefore, Generalized Least Square (GLS) instead of OLS regression is adopted as a multivariate test technique. Habbash (2010) argued that when the number of time series data is small and the number of cross-sectional units is large, the statistical inference is conditional on the observed cross-sectional units in the sample. Hence, the choice of the random effect approach is more accurate. This study encompasses a three-year time series data and has relatively large number of crosssectional units which also make the random effect approach more appropriate. Moreover, the fixed effects approach applies a dummy variable to identify firms. This, in turn, would result in a large number of parametric relative to the number of observations. Thus, the power of the model would be weakened because of the loss of degrees of freedom. Therefore, a pooled cross-sectional GLS (random effects) model is applied in order to examine the proposed relationships. Statistical analysis of the data is then performed by using the computer program STATA. Table 4 
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Consistent with the H1 that states there is a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board and EM, the result suggests that there is a negative and significant relationship, hence, H1 is supported. The findings show that discretionary accruals are decreasing when boards are comprised of independent outside directors. These findings are consistent with the previous studies (Alves, Saleh et al.(2005) as reported greater associated with firms that combine the roles of chairman and CEO and EM that support agency theory predictions regarding the increase of agency problems associated with dual governance structure.
The obtained outcome suggests that there is a negative and significant relationship between board financial expertise and the indicator of EM. H3 is also supported. This suggests that independent directors with corporate and financial backgrounds are vital to deter managed earnings. This finding is consistent with the previous studies (Bedard et al., 2004; Park and Shin, 2004; Xie et al., 2003) . Furthermore, consistent with H4, the result find that there is a negative and significant relationship between board governance expertise and the indicator of EM, hence, H4 is supported. This result is also found by Bedard et al. (2004) and Saleh et al. (2005) . This indicates that the greater the additional number of other directorships held by members of board has a relationship with lower EM activity and enhances the company.
The study finding suggests a positive and significant relationship between board firm-specific expertise and EM. Thus, H5 is supported as well. The same result found by Hahsim (2009) and Xie et al. (2003) . The increase in the number of years independent directors served in the firm provides them the capacity to manage earnings effectively which results in a lower of FRQ. Moreover, there is a negative and significant relationship between board size and EM, and thus, H6 is supported. As a result boards' size is more effective in monitoring financial reporting and in decreasing EM activities (Abed et Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002) . The model finds a significant positive relationship between ROA and EM. Prior studies found that firms with strong performance are more likely to manage discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999) . The result of this study shows that CFO has a significant but negative relationship with EM activity. This finding is consistent with the notion that the firms with a strong CFO performance are less likely to manage discretionary accruals because they already performing well (Becker et al., 1998; Habbash, 2010; Jiang et al., 2008; Lobo and Zhou, 2006) .
Leverage represents the debt structure of a company and is usually applied in various observations as a measure for debt covenant violations. In the context of this study, it is obtained that highly leverage companies are less involved in fraudulent practices such as EM. The negative relationship between leverage and discretionary accruals is consistent with a conservative accounting attitude that responds to debt holders concern in assessing potential loan or in monitoring borrower's ability to pay back existing loans (Becker et al., 1998; Watts, 2003 
Further analyses
It is common to use the non-parametric tests in EM studies, since some of the prior studies choose the solution of doing nothing about the problems of not meeting the parametric test assumptions and carry on using this type of test while recognizing its limitation (Benkel et 
Summary and conclusions
As a response to the recent worldwide financial crisis, the JCGC has introduced to improve the monitoring mechanisms of board of directors, audit committee and the external auditor. The managers' capacity to control the reported earnings opportunistically is constrained by the effectiveness of internal monitoring such as corporate boards. Boards of directors are responsible for monitoring the quality of information contained in financial statements, and thus they control the behavior of managers to guarantee that their actions are aligned with the shareholders' interests.
Therefore, this study has investigated whether the boards characteristics help constrain management opportunity behaviors. In particular, the paper has paid its full-fledge concentration to assess the main characteristics of the boards that are highlighted by JCGC (2009) recommendations: board independence, CEO duality, board financial expertise, board governance expertise, board firmspecific expertise (tenure) and board size. Discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for the level of EM. The data in the analyses were collected form ASE during the period 2008-2010.
The observed findings suggest some certain decisive conclusions. The findings indicates that board independence, board financial expertise, board governance expertise and board size have a significant negative nexus with EM level. This is consistent with the previous studies as suggested that the independence, financial expertise, governance expertise and size of the boards will constrain EM activity. However, the results suggest that CEO duality and board firm-specific expertise (tenure) have a positive relationship with EM activity. These findings indicate that there is a need to strengthen these elements of corporate governance. The JCGC has to enforce the separation of chairman and CEO as recommended. Though, regulators cannot force managers of companies to hold the company's stock.
The founded data also reveals that managerial ownership can mitigate the potential conflict arising from the separation of control and ownership. The companies listed in second market, highly leverage, CFO and Big4 audit firm have less EM activities and that there are more EM activities when company size, company growth and ROA are high. The findings of this study, for the Jordanian context, make the following contributions. First, the outcomes suggest that, on average, board independence, board financial expertise, board governance expertise and board size have an impact on the level of EM in Jordanian listed companies and in turn, have a positive nexus with the amelioration of FRQ. In particular, this finding betokens that both CEO duality and board firmspecific expertise have a positive association with EM activity, this resulted in lower of FRQ. Second, given the similarities between Jordan and other countries, the findings based in this study provide useful applicable information for the regulators. Finally, the findings also generate necessary information to investors in evaluating the role and impact of board characteristics on FRQ.
